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GLEN J. ELLIS, #1514
Attorney Pro Se for the Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
P.O. Box 1097
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 377-1097
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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

GLEN J. ELLIS/
Plaintiff & Appellant

PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 870252-CA

vs.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO.

Defendant & Respondent.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Appellant and petitions the
court for a Writ of Certiorari as permitted by Rule 46 of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court as follows:

1.
WHETHER
THE PLAINTIFF'S
DISABILITY RETIREMENT
QUALIFIED HIM FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 49-10-28 OF
THE UTAH CODE AND THE EFFECT THAT THE 1983 AMENDMENT, 49-9a-8
U.C.A. HAD ON VESTED RETIREMENT BENEFITS?
2.
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF HAS A CONSTITUTIONALLY
VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO AN EARNED DISABILITY PENSION?

2££E£°EwI£syiD^j^^
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This case was heard in the Utah Court of Appeals; a
published opinion under Case Number 870252-CA was filed on July
6, 1988> a copy of the opinion is attached.
Plaintiff's
subsequent petition for rehearing was denied by an order of the
Court of Appeals, dated August 16, 1988, copy attached. Those
two decisions are the basis for this petition.

A.
Date of entry of decision - July 6, 1988.
B.
Order denying Appellant's petition for rehearing
dated 16 August, 1988.
C.
Cross Petition:
No cross petition is expected to
be filed by the Respondent.
D.
Jurisdiction for this writ is based on Rule 42 of
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court based on an erroneous
decision of the Court of Appeals, and Sections 78-2-2 and
78-2a-4 U.C.A.

1.
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution, "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law."
§tata££a w £o^^£ £2L£ t £ uad,
2.
49-9a-8 U.C.A. See full text in the appendix.
3.
49-10-28 U.C.A. See full text in the appendix.

££^£H£E^Q£U.Z££U£^E
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THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued for disability retirement benefits under
the 1967 Public Employees Disability Retirement provisions but
was refused benefits by the Retirement Board based on their
attorney's opinion, that passage of the 1983 Disability
Retirement Act and particularly 49-9a-8 U.C.A. had "implicitly
repealed" the previous Disability Retirement Statute, 49-10-28
U.C.A. was later repealed by the legislature, effective July 1,
1987, one year after Plaintiff's effective retirement date.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
After administrative denial of benefits^ Plaintiff was
granted a hearing before the Retirement Board which affirmed the
administrative decision* The Third District Court> Salt Lake
County affirmed. Plaintiff appealed to the Utah State Court of
Appeals which held that the 1983 Act did not repeal the earlier
statute and also held that retirement benefits under the 1963
Act vested in the constitutional sense but affirmed disallowance
of benefits because Plaintiff did not meet the qualification of
total disability in the 1983 Act. Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Rehearing which the Appeals Court denied.
§ZAT £ J4EE^2F W FAC^
1.
Plaintiff
was the head
of
the Provo City
Attorney's Office for twenty-one and one-half (21 1/2) years,
(from January> 1965 to July> 1986)> during twenty of those years
the Plaintiff, and his employer, on his behalf contributed under
the Utah State Retirement Act a percentage of his annual salary
which included a contribution of .04% of his salary to the
Disability Retirement Fund, pursuant to 49-10-28 U.C.A.

4
2.
On April 28, 1986 the Plaintiff applied to the
City
for disability
retirement based on his physicians1
recommendation that he seek less stressful employment (See
Exhibit "A" attached).
3.
The city accepted the medical retirement request
effective July 1, 1986 (he remained on the payroll however
until
October 30, 1986), and the City certified Plaintiff's
qualifications for retirement under 49-10-28 U.C.A. to the State
Retirement Office (See Exhibit "B" attached).
4.
On June 13, 1986, Bert Hunsaker, Executive
Director of the Retirement Board, denied benefits on the go^Lg
ground that the disability provisions of 49-10 had been
superceded by the enactment in 1983 of Sections 49-9a-4 and
49-9a-8 (See Exhibit "C" attached).
5.
Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing
before the Retirement Board, which Board acknowledged that he
was qualified to retire under 49-10-28 U.C.A., but denied
benefits under the same theory, that there had been an "implicit
repeal" of that section, based on their legal counsel's
interpretation of 49-9a-8 U.C.A.
Plaintiff's appeal of the
administrative denial of his request for benefits was affirmed
by the Retirement Board, (See Exhibit "D").
6.
The matter was then appealed to the Third District
Court in Salt Lake County where Judge Noel was of the opinion
that the legislature did not intend that the two disability
retirement programs described in 49-9a and 49-10-28 U.C.A. exist
side by side and Judge Noel without a hearing or trial granted
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (See Exhibit "E").
1.
The Plaintiff next appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals, which on July 6, 1988 entered an opinion which held
directly contrary to the "implicit repeal" theory, but affirmed
the District Court's judgment (See Exhibit "F" attached).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S DISABILITY RETIREMENT
QUALIFIED HIM FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER
SECTION 49-10-28 OF THE UTAH CODE AND THE
EFFECT THAT THE 1983 AMENDMENT HAD ON VESTED
RETIREMENT BENEFITS?

1.
The
sole
basis
for
admistrative
denial of
Plaintiff's request for retirement benefits under 49-10-28
U.C.A. was a claimed "implicit repeal" of the 1967 Public
Employee's Retirement Act disability benefits which Defendant
claimed was affected by the passage of the new disability
retirement provisions found in 49-9a U.C.A.
The Court of
Appeals did not agree with the trial court's premise and held

HLJ2££&L9" (See A PPe a l s Court Opinion, center paragraph of page
three.)
2.
The Appeals Court continued on however, and
erroneously interpreted 49-9a-8 D.CA, as applying to gi^L
disabilities with the date of disability after July 1, 1983 and
the court
skipped
over
the key word, "£&££££&"' which
differentiates
between
the two
self-subsisting
retirement
disability systems* That is the second word of 49-9a-8 which
reads:
"All £&££££& disabilities with an effective date
of disability on or after the effective date of
this act shall be administered under this act*
Disabilities commencing before the effective date
of this act shall be administered under the
provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no event,
may a disability be covered under both Chapter 10,
Title 49 and this act." (Emphasis added.)
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The court then proceeds to rely entirely on the time
relationship of the disability and the effective date of the
1983 disability act and ignores three important points,
(1) The first point is that they missed the key word
in 49-9a-8 which makes it applicable only to " ££EJ££fs£L"
disabilities. An employee whose employer opted not to subscribe
for the optional coverage provided by 49-9a, (a decision which
is made by the unit of government, with no input from the
employee) is not "covered"; and his disability is not a "covered
disability" under the statute*
Since his disability is not
"covered" by 49-9a> the only real question is whether he is
covered by 49-10-28 U.C.A.
(2) Second/ there is a vast difference between the
definition of a covered disability in the new disability act
wh ich

requires
,,

as

m

b£teLJtt£2l2^^

^E£i£ZEl£ll|k
compared with the much broader definition of
disability under 49-10-6(34) where disability means "incapacity
of a member to perform the a g i & L j g ^
with
an employer."
Plaintiff's condition is not, by definition,
"covered" by 49-9a> but is by 49-10-28.
(3) The third point which the appeals court ignored is
the fact that the legislature did later repeal 49-10-28 but that
repealer was not effective until the 1st day of July, 1987 >
exactly one year after Plaintiff's benefits vested. The error
made by the Retirement Board, its' attorney and
its'
administrator was figaiiEJ^^
A.
The Appeals Court rejected the "implicit repeal"
position but still denied benefits on the contention that the P
Paintiff did not meet the definition of "Disability" as defined
in 49-9a-3 (10) (1983). This was plain error on the part of the
Appeals Court, which ignored the fact that 49-10-28 was still
applicable law on the date of retirement and the conditions set
in that pension plan are the only ones applicable.

7
Continued existence of 49-10-28 included the providing
of benefits to anyone who met the conditions imposed by £hgrt
section up until repealer of the act in 1987. The following
sections of the 1967 act buttress that position; See 49-10-2
which provides a public retirement system for those employees
and dependants who in case of old age disability or death or who
have become incapacitated, may without hardship or prejudice be
retired from active service by their employers*
B.
49-10-2.5 which was B S S S S ^ S S ^
in 1 9 8 3
&2£wJl£*^
' Provides that the parent act>
49-10 shall govern any conflict* discrepancy or inconsistency
which might occur between the parent act and any other statute
relating to retirement*, supplemental or deferred income programs.
C.
49-10-7 U.C.A. provides that it is to be the
policy of the legislature that this act be ii^^^iXw££Gl£^Lii£^
so that the benefits and protections as herein provided shall be
extended as broadly as reasonably possible.
D.
Under 49-10-11 membership was mandatory) as were
the contributions required under the Retirement Act. The new
Act, by contrast, is simply an optional insurance program, which
replaced 49-10-28.5 U.C.A. (1967)> but did not in any way effect
49-10-28 U.C.A. (1967), which remained active and on the books
until a year after Plaintifffs retirement.
It is important to observe, that under 49-10-28 U.C.A.>
millions of dollars of public employee's money was paid into the
Disability Retirement Fund, the exact amount of which is known
only to the Retirement Board staff. Plaintiff estimates that at
least $16,000,000.00 of contributions, plus interest accruing
thereto, since 1967, is in the hands of the Board, and with the
repeal of 49-10-28 is a windfall to the Board> Jllli£jlutDy2w^iSLSS^£
for
&SELJ&xJ2^^
disability retirement. Under the

8
new plan, they simply buy an insurance policy with the
contributed funds, and the insurance carrier pays.
E.
49-10-28 sets forth it's own requirements for
eligibility which require:
1) that the member complete ten
(10) or more years of service (plaintiff had 20 years); 2) that
he submit to examination by the board to determine his physical
condition (Plaintiff remains ready willing and able to comply
with this requirement); and 3) that that examination show that
the member
is physically
or mentally
incapable of the
m
performance
of
the
m&L**Mte
/
(Plaintiff's medical history includes 3 operations for ulcers>
14 hospitalizations and recently diagnosed diabetes meets this
requirement according to his doctors).
F.
49-10-28.5 U.C.A. (1967) describes a paid salary
protection program which was an insurance, almost identical to
the provisions of the so-called new Disability Retirement Act
found in 49-9a U.C.A. effective July 1, 1983.
49-10-28.5
likewise prohibited the employee from collecting both under
Section 28 and Section 28.5.
G.
Interestingly,
49-9a which
went
through
the
legislature as SB 305 went into effect July 1> 1983 (See laws of
Utah 1983, Vol. 1, page 870), but in the 1986 legislature the
language of 49-9a-2 was changed to give Chapter 9a a new
effective date of March 17, 1986, (except for State employees
for whom it became effective July 1, 1987). The compiler also
notes that in 1986 the legislature restricted the scope of 49-9a
b

of
Y 2^&&2wJ^
having it
apply to the whole act, an obvious legislative intent that the
two acts, still then on the statute books, be treated as
independent, equally existing retirement plans.

9
By the time our present code (1987*1988) came into
being7 Chapter 49-9a had disappeared entirely and the present
Utah Public Employee's Disability Act now found in 49-9 U.C.A.
(1987) contains
a third
and
again
distinctly
different
definition of "total disability."
See 49-9-103(7) (1987) "'total disability'
means the complete inability, due to injury or
illness to engage in the employees' ££&Ei££
£££ER£&££[L during the elimination period and the
first
twenty-four
(24) months
of disability
benefits.
Thereafter, 'total disability' means
the complete
feL&&2^^

£££ERa£i£&ww^^^^
It appears to the Plaintiff> that the vacillations of
the Retirement Board, as reflected in it's recommended changes,
effectuated by the Legislature in 1987,
&J^&J&E^^

POINT II. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF HAS A CONSTITUTIONALLY
VESTED
CONTRACTUAL
RIGHT
TO
AN
EARNED
DISABILITY PENSION?
The Appeals Court, in a well reasoned manner, held that
the State of Utah, under
the manditory membership and
contribution plan set forth in the 1967 Public Employees
Retirement Act, 49-10 U.C.A. is committed to the "Contractual
View", ie., that the Constitution (Article I, Section 7: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.") prohibits the Retirement Board from
cutting off vested rights. See Appeals Court Opinion, P. 6:

10
".•.when a retired employee had made the requisite
contributions and had satisfied all conditions
precedent to his benefits, then the employee had a
"vested right" in his retirement benefits as
provided bya n d the
statute a L ^ J & l ^ J i i S ^ ^
a
£££i£££i§il£;
subsequent amendment could not
reduce the amount of benefits to which the
employee was entitled•" (See cases cited.)
From that point on, the Appeals Court Opinion is
totally inconsistent. It ignores the fact, established under
the cited cases, that ^ g ^ S S a ^ i ^
set by
the statute E £ £ & L J & i ^ ^
i.e.>
49-10-28 U.C.A. (1967), and it commits error when it concluded
that because Plaintiff did not fit the 49-9a-3 (10) (1983)
definition, that his rights did not vest.
1.
In the first place, the Appeals Court erred, once
again, in passing over the crucial word "covered."
2.
Secondly, the Appeals Court erred, in failing to
note that 49-10-28 U.C.A. (1967) was still the law until July 1,
1987, when it was repealed.
3.
Third, it ignored the fact that Zl.&&&LLl^&g&u<Mk
of his
g£k£§3&^^
Pension benefits under the
parent act,
QJX£&j£^
4.
Fourth, that the arbitrary decision of Provo City
to not subscribe to the new disability insurance program, can in
no way justify depriving Plaintiff of his vested pension
benefits. After all, the £ l £ u £ £ £ ^ £ ^ ^
its
^&^^££Q£±££^J£l&L-<
benefits
are constitutionally
guaranteed to Plaintiff, so long as he meets the conditions
precedent (which he does in every detail). The fact that he
does not fit the definition in the new insurance program^ which
is not a pension plan, nor capable of vesting (because it is
non-contributory), is totally immaterial and irrelevant. (See
Appeals Court Opinion , p. 5, and cases quoted therein.)

11
SUMMARY
1.
The Appeals Court decision, holding that there was
no "implicit repeal" of the 1967 Public Employee Retirement Act,
should have resulted in a reversal of the District Court
decision, not an affirmation, since the only grounds for either
the Retirement Board decision, or its' affirmation by Judge
Noel, was the theory of "implied repeal." The Appeals Court was
correct on that portion of its' Opinion.
2.
Plaintiff is not a "covered" employee under the
1983 disability insurance; his employer had not opted to be
covered> and his particular medical condition did not qualify
him for coverage, because he was not completely unable to engage
in any renumerative work. Plaintiff was however, still covered
by the pension plan described in 49-10-28 UCA (1967), he met all
the prerequisites for benefits> and since that plan was still
open until repealed on July 1, 1987, his right to benefits
vested on his effective retirement date of July 1> 1986.
3.
The constitutional prohibition against depriving a
citizen of vested
rights, makes
it impossible
for the
legislature to change those benefits in any manner, after the
fact, if it would result in his benefits being eliminated, after
they had vested.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, THIS 12th Day of September,
1988.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this 12th day of September in the year 1988 > the
undersigned mailed 10 copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and two copies to Mark A.
Madsen, Attorney for the Respondent, Utah State Retirement
Board, 540 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102> postage
prepaid in the U.S. Mail.

(801) 375-1822. Ext. 330

April 28, 1986
TO:
FROM:
RE:

Mayor Joseph A. Jenkins
Glen J. Ellis
Resignation

Dear Mayor,
Pursuant to our discussions of last week, I have given
some thought to stepping down as City Attorney. I have served
the City since January 1, 1965. The first year I was Assistant
City Attorney, a position under Civil Service, the last 20+ as
a department head. Although I could opt to simply step down to
the assistant status to fill the few remaining years I would
need to put in to qualify for retirement, I have given, some
thought to put in for a medical retirement instead.
The last seven or eight months have been the most
frustrating of my life. I have experienced a great deal of
stress, resulting in a return of my chronic acidosis, a
condition which has been with me for many years, and which
resulted in my having ulcers. I was operated on three times as
a direct result of this condition, and I feel that remaining in
the position I am in will be further detrimental to my health.
I have been in distress with diarrhea and stomach distress for
most of this year, and am obliged to go in for a periodic
dilation of my esophagus about every nine months. All of this
is directly connected to my stressful employment. I feel that
my long history of ulcer-related problems will probably be with
me for the rest of my life, and if I take my retirement at this
time, I can still be covered by City insurance.
Accordingly, will you please accept my resignation as
City Attorney, effective as soon as my replacement can be
selected and trained to take over my case load and other
responsibilities. Please ask personnel to process my request
for medical retirement effective at the same date as I finish
my city service.
Very truly yours,

,
^°tR
,
Joseph A Jenkins

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

April 29, 1986

Mr. Glen Ellis
City Attorney
Post Office Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
Dear Glen:
It is with the utmost respect and concern for you that I accept
your resignation as the City Attorney for Provo City. I want to
express my appreciation for the long years of service you have
given to our City and for the way you handled matters over that
period of time.
Although we have discussed on several occasions your health
problems and the fact that some of them were related to your
employment, I was not fully aware of the extent of your problems
or to the degree your stressful employment contributed to
them. We have instructed Mr. Mausser in Personnel to take the
necessary steps to help you in any way he can in securing a
medical retirement.
We will be advertising for an attorney for your replacement and
anticipate that advertising and the selection process will take
approximately six weeks. We will then look to you for guidance
in the training and acclimation of the person we select. We will
leave the final date of your retirement open pursuant to getting
another attorney on board and trained to take your place.
If there are any other concerns that you have or help that I can
give you please don't hesitate to call.
Sincerely,

Joseph A. Jenkins
Mayor
cc

Personnel

JAJ/nks

UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
(801)355-3884
BERT D. HUNSAKER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

June 1 3 , 1986

Mr. Glen J. Ellis, City Attorney
City of Provo
P. O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603

Dear Mr. Ellis:
The 1983 Legislature effectively repealed the disability provisions
from section 49-10f U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which pertains to the Utah
State Retirement System. At that time they enacted 49a of the Code,
which was an optional program for local governments and other political
subdivisions. In doing this, the legislature also reduced the
contribution rate to the employers.
Provo City did not join the disability plan and elected to provide
its own program. Therefore, disability coverage in the State Retirement
System, as far as Provo City is concerned, terminated July 1, 1983.
I respectfully refer you to section 49-9a, with particular
attention to 49-9a-4 and 49-9a-8. After you have had a chance to review
these sections, if you have additional questions, please write or call
me or, if you prefer, Mark Madsen, General Counsel for the Retirement
Board, may be reached at the same address and telephone number.

BDHtwhm

UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
(801)355-3884
BERT D. HUNSAKER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

February 16, 1987

Mr. Glen J . E l l i s
P. 0 . Box 1097
Provo, Utah 84603
REGISTERED MAIL

Dear Mr. E l l i s :
This letter is written confirmation of the action taken by the Utah
State Retirement Board regarding your appeal of the administrative
denial of your disability retirement application.
The Board voted to deny your request, based on advice of legal
counsel and the interpretation of section 49-9a-a, enacted in 1983 by
the Utah Legislature, which it feels specifically negates the disability
provisions of section 49-10, U.C.A., as amended.
As was explained to you at the hearing, Provo City elected not to
participate in the disability program provided in 49-9a, and chose to
provide its own program. Disability coverage of Provo City under
any programs by the State terminated when Provo chose to exclude the
benefits of 49-9a from its employees and provide another disability
program. It would appear from these facts that the real issue here is
one with Provo City and not the Utah State Retirement Board.
If I may provide any further information I shall be happy to do so.
Yours sincerely,
y
y /

Bert D.^Hunsaker
Executive Director
BDH:whm
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JUDGE

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Glen J. Ellis,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Utah State Retirement Board,

Case No. 870252-CA

Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson*

BILLINGS,

Judge:

FILED
Tirfiothy M. Shoa
< C / r k of the Court
UI?fi Coc'i of Appeals

Plaintiff Ellis appeals from the district court's
decision affirming an administrative denial of his application
for disability retirement benefits. Ellisf main contention is
that the lower court erred in upholding the administrative
ruling that the 1983 Utah Disability Act rather than the 1967
Utah State Retirement Act governed his claim for disability
benefits. We affirm the district courtfs judgment.
Ellis was the head of the Provo City Attorney's Office
for over 20 years. According to Ellis' attending physician,
Ellis suffered numerous medical conditions stemming from the
stressful nature of his employment. Consequently, on April 28,
1986, Ellis applied for disability retirement benefits. He was
not totally disabled but, rather, sought less stressful legal
employment.
The Utah State Retirement Board denied Ellis* application
for disability retirement benefits finding the Legislature
replaced the disability plan under which Ellis sought benefits,
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981), with an optional
plan in 1983, &££ Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984), in
which Provo elected not to participate and under which, in any
event, Ellis would not have qualified because he was not
totally disabled.
Ellis objected to the administrative denial of benefits
and sought a formal hearing before the Board. In a hearing

held in February 1987# the Board listened to Ellis and then
requested Ellis to leave the room so the Board could consider
his application. The Board denied Ellis1 application for
benefits. In response, Ellis filed a complaint in district
court seeking a review of the Board's decision. He claimed
that if the Board was correct in finding the Legislature
repealed the retirement plan under which he sought benefits/
then this repeal was unconstitutional. Ellis also challenged
the procedure of the Retirement Board claiming the Board failed
to comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and the
Open and Public Meetings Act.
The Board moved to dismiss Ellis* complaint asserting it
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Ellis moved for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of
law, the 1983 enactment of the long-term disability act did not
repeal the retirement plan under which he sought benefits. The
court granted the Board's motion to dismiss and denied Ellis'
motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued.
I.
At the outset, we must determine whether the Legislature
replaced the 1967 retirement program under which Ellis sought
and qualified for disability benefits. Since this issue raises
a question of special law, see Utah Dep't of Admin, Servs. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983), we must
determine whether the Board's decision falls within the limits
of reasonableness or rationality. Id.
Our analysis of whether the Legislature replaced the
earlier retirement program is best understood against the
background of the relevant statutory history. Between July 1,
1967, and June 30, 1983, state retirement benefits were
governed by the Utah State Retirement Act. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981). Section 49-10-28 of tho Retirement
Act provided that a state employee was entitled to disability
benefits provided the employee had worked at least 10 years for
the state and a medical examination determined that the
employee was -physically or mentally incapable of performance
of the usual duties of his employment and should be retired and
the administrator so recommends to the board."
On March 10, 1983, the Legislature enacted the Utah
Public Employees' Disability Act. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 223, § 1
(codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984)). The
Legislature did not expressly repeal the Utah State Retirement
Act when it enacted the Disability Act; however, the
Legislature clearly provided that the Disability Act would
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cover all disabilities with a date of disability on or after
the effective date of the Act, namely July 1, 1983. 1983 Utah
Laws ch. 223, § 2; Utah Code Ann. § 49~9a-8 (1984). Provisions
of the Disability Act relevant to the instant case, with our
emphasis added, provide:
section 49-9a-4: All employers
participating in the Utah state retirement
system may cover their employees under this
act. Nothing in this act shall require any
political subdivision or educational
institution to be covered by this act.
section 49-9a-8: All covered disabilities
with a date of disability on or after the
effective date of this act shall be
administered under this act, Disabilities
commencing before the effective date of this
act shall be administered under the
provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no
event, may a disability be covered under
both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this act.
Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear, express language
provided that two disability retirement systems would co-exist
in Utah. The earlier 1967 Retirement Act would continue to
cover disabilities commencing before the effective date of the
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose disabilities
commenced after the 1983 Disability Act became effective would
be governed by the later Disability Act.
In order to receive disability benefits under the
Disability Act, the employee must be totally disabled.
"Totally disabled" is defined by the Disability Act to mean
"complete inability to engage in any gainful occupation which
is reasonable, considering the employee's education, training
and experience." Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-3(10) (1984). 1 The
effective date of the Disability Act was July 1, 1983. 1983
Utah Laws ch. 223, § 2. After July 1, 1983, the Retirement
Board refused to accept contributions for the Chapter 10, Title
49 fund.
1. Ellis concedes he is not "totally disabled" as defined by
the Disability Act and, therefore, does not qualify for
disability benefits under this statutory scheme.

On appeal# Ellis contends the Legislature did not
impliedly repeal the Utah State Retirement Act when it
subsequently enacted the Disability Act. We agree that the
Legislature did not impliedly repeal the Retirement Act but,
rather# by clear language, it expressly replaced the Retirement
Act with the Disability Act for disability retirements
commencing after the Disability Act's effective date*
We acknowledge the authority governing implied repeals of
legislation. As a general proposition, implied repeals are not
favored and are found only if there is a manifest inconsistency
or conflict between the earlier and later statutes. State v.
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980). Subsequently enacted
statutes relating to the same subject matter as previous
statutes are, if possible, to be construed so as to make the
later enactments harmonious with the former provisions. Stahl
v. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980).
Nonetheless,
[W]here a consistent body of laws cannot be
maintained without the abrogation of a
previous law, a repeal by implication of
previous legislation . . . is readily found
in the terms of the later enactment. It is
the necessary effect of the later enactment
construed in the light of the existing law
that ultimately determines an implied
repeal. . . . [W]here a conflict is readily
seen by an application of the later
enactment in accord with [the legislative]
intent, it is clear that the later enactment
is intended to supersede the existing law.
1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09, at 332
(4th ed. 1985). This is so because when there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior
statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision
is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of the
Legislature. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah
1983).
The foregoing authority, however, is inapplicable as we
are persuaded the Legislature clearly and expressly provided
that the Utah State Retirement Act would continue to govern
disabilities arising before July 1, 1983, the effective date of
the Disability Act, but all those disability retirements
occurring thereafter would be governed by the Disability Act.
Therefore, there is no irreconcilable conflict between the
Retirement Act and the Disability Act as the two acts are
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mutually exclusive. A disability is governed by one statutory
act or the other, but not both. A consistent body of law is
maintained and the Disability Act does not abrogate the
Retirement Act.
The date of Ellis1 disability is April 26, 1986, i.e.,
after July 1, 1983, which is the effective date of the
Disability Act. Consequently, the Disability Act governs
Ellis" disability retirement benefits. However, as previously
mentioned, supra Note 1, Ellis is not ••totally disabled" as
required by the Disability Act. Therefore, Ellis is not
entitled to disability benefits under the governing statutory
scheme.
II.
Notwithstanding our holding that Ellis does not qualify
for benefits under either retirement scheme, we must now
determine whether the Legislature's replacement of the
Retirement Act with the Disability Act unconstitutionally
deprived Ellis of vested contractual rights. Ellis contends
that if the Disability Act governs his eligibility for
disability retirement benefits, then he was unconstitutionally
denied his vested contractual rights to an earned disability
pension. Under Utah law, Ellis* argument is without merit.
There are two lines of authority addressing the rights of
retired employees. One line of authority holds that a
retirement plan is a gratuity in which the recipient has no
vested rights and, consequently, is freely terminable at the
employer's option. See, e.g., Keeaan v. Board of Trustees, 412
111. 430, 107 N.E.2d 702 (1952) (retirement plans which mandate
compulsory participation confer no vested rights upon
recipients because statutes affording such benefits rest upon
the sovereign power of the state and are not in the nature of
contracts between the participant and the state); Roach v.
State Bd. of Retirement, 331 Mass. 41, 116 N.E.2d 850 (1954)
(holding that an employee had no vested rights to pension which
were infringed by the repeal of the pension statute despite
employee's eligibility for retirement prior to repeal); Dallas
v, Trammell, 129 Tex. 150, 101 S.W.2d 1009 (1937) (public
employee has no vested rights in a statutory pension).
The other line of authority adheres to the contractual
view which reasons that once a public employee has fulfilled
all the conditions precedent to receiving retirement benefits,
the employee has certain vested rights which cannot be impaired
by subsequent administrative or legislative enactments. See,
e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 541 (1965)
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(right to public pension vests upon acceptance of public
employment and laws of state are part of every contract); Betts
v. Board of Admin, of the Pub, Employees' Retirement Sys., 21
Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158, 582 P.2d 614 (1978) (public
employee's pension constitutes an element of compensation, and
a vested contractual right to pension accrues upon acceptance
of employment); In re State Employees' Pension Plan. 364 A.2d
1228 (Del. 1976) (vested contractual rights exist under state
pension law for those public employees who have fulfilled

eligibility requirements); H U e s Vt Tennessee Consolidated
Retirement Sys., 548 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1977) (public employee
has contractual right to pension benefits). Under the
contractual view, state legislatures may reasonably alter the
terms or modify the retirement system to improve it or keep it
on a sound basis prior to retirement for purposes of
maintaining the integrity of the system. See, e.g., Betts, 582
P.2d at 617. Once the retirement benefits have vested,
however, the Legislature can modify the plan only upon a
showing that a vital state interest will be protected, Miles,
548 S.W.2d at 305, and only where a substantial substitute is
provided for in lieu of the loss of benefits sustained.
Newcombe v. Ooden City Public School Teacher's Retirement
Comm'n, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 948 (1952).
Utah adheres to the contractual line of authority. In
Driqqs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Bd., 105 Utah 417, 142
P.2d 657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an
employee who receives a mere gratuitous allowance awarded for
appreciation of past services has no vested rights in the
allowance and it is terminable at will. Iii. at 659. On the
other hand, when a retired employee had made the requisite
contributions and had satisfied all conditions precedent to his
benefits, then the employee had a -vested right" in his
retirement benefits as provided by the statute at the time of
his retirement and a subsequent amendment could not reduce the
amount of benefits to which the employee was entitled. Iii. at
663-64.
Since Driqqs, our supreme court has consistently held
that the employee has this vested pontractual right only when
he has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving the
benefit, i.e., he has attained retirement age, or has been
medically disabled. See Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement
Svs. Bd. of Admin., 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 597 (1952);
Newcombe v. Qqden Citv Public School Teachers* Retirement
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Comm'n, 121 Utah 503# 243 P.2d 941, 947 (1952).2
Based upon the foregoing authority, we are persuaded
Ellis was not depriye.fl_of vested contractual beneflts^Jbecause
he failed to saTisfy the conditions precedent to hlsLjdisability
retirernenT"benefiTs, namely~"El 1 is had not become disabled and
retired before the Legislature enacted the Disability Act.
Consequently, he was not entitled to benefits under the
governing Disability Act.
III.
Ellis further contends the Retirement Board violated the
Administrative Rulemaking Act3 by failing to comply with rule
making procedures when it determined the Retirement Act had
been replaced by the Disability Act in deciding Ellis1
eligibility for disability benefits. Ellis contends that such
a determination was, in effect, a policy determination subject
to adequate advance notice to all affected parties, an
2. We note, however, that Driqgs was slightly modified in
Newcombe. In Newcombe, the court held a statute which dissolved
a statutory pension system invalid as to retired employees.
Newcombe, 243 P.2d at 948. In dictum, however, the court
acknowledged that had the Legislature -attempted to make changes
in local retirement systems for the purpose of strengthening
them, there would be no difficulty in finding authority to
support such action.- Xfl. at 946. To support this dictum, the
court relied on several cases holding that vested rights of
retired employees are not impaired by a reduction in the amount
of the pension payments pursuant to statutes enacted subsequent
to retirement, provided the purpose of such statutes is to
render the retirement pension system actuarially sound.
3. The Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-46a-l to -15 (1986), was significantly revised and amended
in 1987, after the commencement of this action. Accordingly,
our analysis focuses on the administrative provisions in effect
at the time of Ellis' hearing before the Retirement Board.
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opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment.4
Any agency subject to the Administrative Rulemaking Act
promulgating a rule must follow the procedures specified. See
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986)
(interpreting the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to the
Administrative Rulemaking Act). The Administrative Rulemaking
Act requires rule making whenever "agency actions affect a
class of persons" and defines a rule as "a statement made by an
agency that applies to a general class of persons, rather than
specific persons . . . [which] implements or interprets policy
made by statute . . . .• Utah Code Ann, §§ 63-46a-(3)(a),
-2(8) (1986).5
The critical question, therefore, is whether the
Retirement Boardfs decision to deny Ellis disability retirement
benefits based upon its interpretation of the language of the
Disability Act amounted to a rule within the meaning of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act. "We acknowledge that there is a
variance of opinion on when an agency is engaged in rule making
and must follow formal rule making procedures, and when an
agency may legitimately proceed by way of adjudication."
Williams, 720 P.2d at 776. gee generally 2 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 7,2 (2d ed. 1979). "Many rules
are the product of rulemaking, and rulemaking is the part of
the administrative process that resembles a legislature's
enactment of a statute. An order is the product of
adjudication, and adjudication is the part of the
4. The Retirement Board contends that Ellis did not raise the
applicability of the Administrative Rulemaking Act below and,
therefore, is precluded from raising this issue for the first time
on appeal. We disagree. The record indicates that Ellis raised
this issue not only in his amended complaint but also in his
motion for summary judgment.
5. The Retirement Board argues that it is exempt from the
Administrative Rulemaking Act because it is a "political
subdivision." Since the commencement of this action, the Utah
State Retirement Act was amended and the Legislature decreed that
the Board "shall voluntarily comply" with the provisions of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-201(4)
(1987). This new language implies that during the period of time
at issue here the Board may indeed have been exempt from the Act's
coverage. But see Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion 86-16
(June 4, 1986), wherein Utahfs Attorney General concludes that the
Retirement Board was required to comply with the requirements of
the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Inasmuch as we conclude that
the Board, in any event, complied with the Act, we need not decide
whether it was required to do so.
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administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a
case." 2 K. Davis# Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2, at 4 (2d
ed. 1979).
In Williams v. Public Serv, Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the definition of
"rule* contained in the Utah Rule Making Act/ the predecessor to
the Administrative Rulemaking Act.6 In Williams, the
petitioners charged the Public Service Commission with failure
to follow proper administrative procedures in concluding that it
did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way mobile telephone
paging services. The supreme court held that the Commissions
letter stating that no certificate of public convenience and
necessity was required constituted a "rule" and# consequently,
the Commission, when reaching this determination, should have
followed the rule making procedures. 111. at 776. The court
relied on three factors in reaching this conclusion. First, the
Commission's decision was generally applicable. Second, the
letter interpreted the scope of the Commission's statutory
regulatory powers, thus interpreting the law within the meaning
of the Act. Finally, in so acting, the Commission made a
"change in clear law" by reversing its long-settled position
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction and announcing a
fundamental policy change. Id.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the Retirement Board
was not engaged in rule making and, therefore, did not have to
adhere to rule making procedural requirements. Rather, the
Board was merely applying the explicit statutory language of the
Disability Act to the facts of Ellis" case. The explicit
language of the Disability Act provides that that Act, not the
Retirement Act, governs all disabilities with a date of
disability after July 1, 1983. Ellis1 date of disability is
April 26, 1986. This administrative process does not resemble
the Legislature^ enactment of a statute. On the contrary, the
administrative process examined here resembles a court's
decision applying explicit statutory language- The only policy
decision which was generally applicable was made by the
Legislature in its enactment of the Disability Act. The change
in clear law in this instance was promulgated by the
Legislature, not the Retirement Board. Therefore, the
Retirement Board was not compelled to follow the rule making
procedures of the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
6. The court stated that its conclusion would not be any
different had the court been called upon to interpret the
definition of "rule" within the meaning of the subsequently
enacted Administrative Rulemaking Act. Williams, 720 P.2d at
775 n.7.
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IV.
The final issue we address is whether the Retirement Board
violated the Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981)# when it requested Ellis to leave the
room while it deliberated his appeal from the administrative
denial of benefits.
The Open and Public Meetings Act requires that every
"meeting" of a "public body" be open to the public. As used in
this Act, "public body" means "any administrative, advisory,
executive or legislative body of the state or its political
subdivisions which consists of two or more persons that expends,
disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue and
which is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding
the public's business." Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(2) (1981).
We are persuaded that the Open and Public Meetings Act is
not applicable to the Retirement Board. First, the Utah State
Retirement Fund is administered as a common trust fund and not
supported by tax revenue. Second, the Retirement Board is not
vested with authority to make decisions regarding the public's
business. The Board administers funds for the benefit of the
beneficiaries and not for the public at large. Hansen v. Utah
State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Utah 1982). When
Hansen was decided, "[s]ome 80 percent of the beneficiaries
[were] not state employees, but employees of municipalities or
counties." l£l. "No state funds [were] appropriated to meet any
administrative costs." III. Ellis' argument that the Board
acted contrary to the Open and Public Meetings Act is without
merit.
Affirmed.

xhdt6£, no

z?;

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

t^^z

7~ ^L^^XP
Greenwood, Judge

:-^" C- Uu^JU**^
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

Glen J. Ellis,
Plaintiff, and Appellant,

ORDER
No. 870252-CA

v.
Utah State Retirement Board,
Defendant and Respondent,

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Rehearing
filed by the appellant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's petition for
rehearing is denied.
Dated this 16th day of August, 1988.
FOR THE COURT:

APPENDIX

UTAH CODE
: 915-1986

Pensions

event shall the amount of the death benefit
provided by this section be less than S600 and the
accumulated contributions of the deceased member,
except for:
(1) A person who entered covered employment
it age 65 or later. This deceased member's benefit
shall be a refund of his accumulated contributions
or $600, whichever is larger.
(2) A deceased member who has no dependent
beneficiary. This deceased member's death benefit
shall be a refund of his accumulated contributions
or $600, whichever is larger.
(c) The foregoing part of the death benefit as
provided in (b), based upon the member's past
compensation, shall not be paid to the beneficiary
of an inactive member unless the member has credit
for ten or more years of service or unless the death
of the member occurs either: (1) Within a period of
120 calendar days after the last day of service for
which said person received compensation; (2) while
said person is still physically or mentally incapacitated from performance of his duties, provided that
such incapacity has been continuous since the last
day of service for which he received compensation,
or (3) said person is on military leave and has
elected to remain in active contributing membership
natus as provided in section 49-10-19; providing
that in no case shall such part of the death benefit
is cited in this paragraph be paid to any person
except a dependent beneficiary.
(d) The death benefit for an inactive member,
except as otherwise provided in (c) above, shall be a
return of the deceased member's accumulated contributions only.
(e) A member, or his beneficiary after death of
the member, may elect, by a written document filed
vith the retirement office, to have the death benefit
paid in monthly installments, fixed in number or
unount, but not involving life contingencies, subject
to such rules as the board may adopt. Regular
interest shall be credited on the unpaid balance of
men benefit.
Payment of the foregoing death benefits by the
retirement office shall be deemed to be a full acquittance of a beneficiary's claim against the system,
tnd the said system shall not be liable for any
further or additional claims or assessments on
behalf of the deceased member.
Unless specified otherwise in a written document
ffttd in the retirement office on or after July 1,
1971, death benefits payable to dependent beneficiaries shall be made in the following order of precedence:
(1) Surviving spouse,
(2) Surviving children under 21 years of age,
*nd mentally or physically handicapped children
*gardless of age, share and share alike,
(3) All other dependent beneficiaries.
If the deceased member has no dependent benefi3*ry and section 49-10-42 is not applicable, the last
written beneficiary designation on file with the retic e n t office shall be used in determining the beneficiary or beneficiaries to- whom death benefit
2*yments should be made. In the event there are no
^pendent beneficiaries and no beneficiary designation on file with the retirement office, the death
2*yments shall be distributed in accordance with the
Provisions of section 49-10-43.
Ixi the implementation of this section and for
Administrative purposes only, the Utah tax commissi* is authorized and directed to provide pertinent
^formation to the retirement administrator, upon

49-10-28.5

his request, concerning dependents claimed by a
deceased member on his income tax return covering
the year previous to his death,
tm
49-10-25. Disability benefits - Requirements for
eligibility - Payment foe medical scrrices and advice
rtndtrtd to board.
A member shall be entitled to receive disability
benefits upon approval of the retirement board after
medical examination if the following requirements
have been met:
(a) Said member has completed and has standing
to his credit ten or more years of service on the
date of disability retirement.
(b) Said member, within two years after last
rendering covered sen ice, and whose covered employment was terminated due to a physical or mental
condition existing at the time of termination, has
been examined by one or more physicians or
surgeons selected by the board pursuant to the
request of his employer, said member or person
acting on his behalf or of the beard.
(c) Said medical examination and such other
evidence as may be available shows to the satisfaction of the administrator that said member is physically or mentally incapable of the performance of
the usual duties of his employment and should be
retired and the administrator so recommends to the
board.
The board shall obtain and pay from the interest
earnings of the fund for such medical services and
advice as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
mi
49-10-24.5. Disabled member - Continuation of
eligibility for retirement benefits - 'Benefit protection contract."
Any department or political subdivision, covered
by any system administered by the retirement office
which has established a paid salary protection
program under which its officers or* employees,
during periods of disability arising out of sickness
or accident, shall be paid by it or by an insurance
underwriter of the disabled member's rate of compensation in effect at the time disability occurred,
may with the approval of the retirement board enter
into a "benefit protection contract* with the retirement office.
The benefit protection contract shall among other
things provide a means whereby:
(1) The disabled person shall be deemed to be an
active participating member of his respective retirement system and as such shall continue to accrue
full-time service and salary credits during the time
member and employer contributions, based upon his
full rate of pay in effect at the time disability
began, are paid to the retirement office.
(2) The disabled person or his beneficiary shall
remain eligible during the contract period for any
retirement system benefits provided by the retirement system act under which he is a member.
The retirement board sinU establish the manner
and times when member and employer contributions
are to be paid. A failure to make the required
payments shall be cause for the board to cancel the
contracts as to all individuals or any individual
covered by the contract. Service and salary credits
granted and accrued up to the time of cancellation,
however, shall not be forfeited.
During the term of the contract the disabled
person shall not be entitled to receive disability retirement benefits under the provisions of the retirement system in which he is covered. However, he

ns for benefits and all matters relating to the adlinistration of the fund. If the executive officer of
le board is unable to determine factors such as
mgth of service, compensation, or the age of any
nployee covered by this act, the executive officer
lay estimate these factors for purposes of any
ecessary determination. An employee may
dailenge any decision of the board and appeal that
ecision to a proper district court of the State of
(tab.
(2) Nothing in this act shall require the observace of formal rules of pleading or evidence in any
earing before the board.
1M3

time during which the employee is entitled to receive
the monthly disability benefit:
(a) Social security, including all benefits
received by the employee, the employee's spouse,
and the employee's dependent chi!i:cn. In the event
social security benefits are increased to compensate
for a change in the consumer price index, the
monthly disability income benefit shall not be
further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits
determined at the level in effect at the time benefits
commence.
(b) Workmen's compensation.
(c) Armed services, retirement or disability
programs.
Ms-7. Employer contribution rate.
(d) Civil service retirement or disability
During each legislative session, the retirement
programs.
oard shall certify to the legislature the percentage
(e) Disability benefits under any group
f employer contributions required to fund the
insurance plan providing disability income benefits
ubtic employees' disability fund. Upon the board's
for which contributions or payroll deductions are
^commendation, the legislature shall adjust retiremade by the employer.
tent contribution rates to maintain adequate
(0 Any retirement or disability program for
jnding for the disability fund.
m)
which the employee is eligible, including, but not
limited to, programs provided by the United States
Ma-4. Disabilities covered by this chapter or retgovernment, state government, or by any departmtment act.
All covered disabilities with a date of disability ent or subdivision thereof.
(3) Any amounts received by or payable to the
n or after the effective date of this act shall be
dministered under this act. Disabilities commencing employee from one or more of the sources listed in
efore the effective date of this act shall be admini- subsection (2) shall be considered as amounts
ered under the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. received by the employee whether or not the
i no event, may a disability be covered under both amounts were actually received by the employee.
(4) In order to be eligible for benefits under this
napter 10, Title 49 and this act.
wt3
act the employee shall first apply for all disability
Ma-9. Periods for which benefits are payable.
benefits from governmental entities listed in subsec(1) Upon receipt of proof that an employee has tion (2) to which the employee is entitled. The
ecome totally disabled as a result of (a) accidental employee shall also first apply at the earliest eligible
odily injury which is the sole cause of disability age for all retirement benefits to which the
nd is sustained while this" act is in force (hereinaf- employee is or may be entitled. If the employee fails
M- referred to as the injury) or (b) disease or illness to apply, the board may make application on the
ausing total disability commencing while this act is employee's behalf. The board may treat as income
x force (hereinafter referred to as the illness), the any amount the employee is entitled to receive but
und will pay to the employee a monthly disability does not receive because application for benefits is
enefit for each month the total disability continues not made by the employee. The board may reduce
eyond the elimination period, not to exceed the the monthly disability accordingly.
tM3
laximum benefit period.
(2) Successive periods of disability which: (a) 49-9a-ll. Psychopathologk disability.
The fund established under this ad does not
esult from the same or related causes, (b) are
eparated by less than six months of continuous full- provide monthly disability benefits for disability
me work at the individual's usual place of emplo- that is primarily due to psychopathology. In the
ment, and (c) commence while the individual is an place of monthly disability benefits for psychopathtnployee covered by this act, shall be considered as ology, the following benefits are provided:
(1) Up to two years of disability benefits based on
single period of disability. The inability to work
or a period less than 15 consecutive days shall not the usual disability provisions.
(2) During the period of disability not to excecu
e considered as a period of disability. Otherwise,
uccessive periods of disability shall be considered two years, payment by the board of up to 510,000
for psychiatric expenses, including rehabilitation
s separate periods of disability.
(3) The retirement board shall have authority at expenses approved by the board's consultants.
(3) If the employee is institutionalized, payment
ay time to have any employee claiming disability
Umined by a physician chosen by the board to by the board of disability benefits according to coletermine if the employee is disabled and the extent ntractual provisions for a period not to exceed five
uo
'f the disability.
ins years.
Ma-10. Amount of benefit payments - Physicians care required - Reductions La benefit payments.
(1) The monthly income disability benefit shall be
*o-thirds of the regular monthly salary paid as of
kc last day of the actual service. Payments shall
Jot be made under the fund established in this act
or any period of disability unless the employee is
fcder the regular care and treatment of a physician.
(2) The monthly disability income benefit
*herwise provided under the fund shall be reduced
*y any amount received by or due the employee

49-9a-12. Disabilities not covered.
The fund does not cover any loss resulting from
the following:
(1) Self-inflicted injury.
(2) War or any act of war, or suffering while in
military or naval services of any country at war.
(3) Alcoholism.
(4) Drug addiction.
19*3
49-9a-13. Termination of disability payments Calculation of disabled employee's retirement
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Pensions

The Insurance Department shall biennially audit
all funds and programs authorized under this
chapter and report its findings to the governor and
the Legislature.
i«7

Chapter 9. Utah Public Employees*
Disability Act.
Pul
Part
Part
Part

1.
2.
3.
4.

General Provisions
The System and Fond
Contributions
Benefits

49-9-302.

period and the first 24 monrhs of disability benefits.
Thereafter, 'total di*abuit>* means the complete
inability to engage in any gainful occupation which
is reasonable, considering twe employee's education,
training, and experience. "Total disability" exists
only if during any period of "total dis.iNIity" the
employee is under the regular care of a physician
other than the emplo>ee.
(8) "Date of disability" means the date on which a
period of continuous disability commences, and may
not commence on or before the last day of actual
work.
ift?
Part 2. The System and Fund

Part 1. General Provisions
49-9-101. Short title.
49-9-102. Purpose.
49-9-103. Definitions.

49-9-101. Short title.
This chapter is known as the 'Utah Public Employees* Disability A c t /
\m
49-9-102. Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide longterm disability benefits for employees of employers
participating in any system administered by the
board except employees covered under the Firefighters* Retirement Act, or employees covered under
the Public Safety Retirement Act who are covered
under a long-term disability program offered by a
political subdivision which is substantially equivalent
to the program offered by the state under this
chapter. The program shall be administered by the
executive officer of the board through the retirement
office, under the policies and rules promulgated by
the board.
19*7
49-9-103. Definitions.
(1) 'Educational institution" means a political
subdivision or an instrumentality of a political subdivision, an instrumentality of the state, or any
combination of these entities, which is primarily
engaged in educational activities or the administration or servicing of educational activities. The term
includes, but is not limited to, the State Board of
Education and any instrumentality o f the State
Board of Education, institutions of higher education
uid their branches, school districts, and vocational
tad technical schools.
(2) "Employee* means any employee of an employer who participates in any system administered by
he board, except those employees exempt from
Average under Section 49-9-102.
(3) "Elimination period* means the five months at
*Jse beginning of each continuous period of total
Usability for which no benefit will be paid and
^mmences with the date of disability.
(4) "Maximum benefit period" means the
^ximum period of time the monthly disability
^ m e benefit will be paid for any continuous
*riod of total disability.
(5) "Physician* means a legally qualified physi- ($) "Rehabilitative employment* means any board*>Proved occupation or employment for wage or
*?ofit, for which the employee is reasonably quali_ *d by education, training, or experience, in which
* employee engages while unable to perform his
Pupation as a result of injury or illness.
ft) "Total disability" means the complete inabi4
*. due to injury or illness, to engage in the empl^*e's regular occupation during the elimination

I
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49-9-201. Cmtloa of prognua.
49-9-202. Creation of trust fand.
49-9-203. Eligibility for membership ia the program.

49-9-201. Creation of program.
There is created for employees of employees participating in any system administered by the board,
unless otherwise exempted under this chapter, the
"Public Employees* Long Term Disability
Program."
in?
49-9-202. Creation of trust fund.
There is created the "Public Employees' Disability
Trust Fund* for the purpose of paying the benefits
and costs of administering this program. The fund
shall consist of all money paid into it in accordance
with this chapter, whether in ihe form of cash, securities, or other assets, and of all money received
from any other source. Custody, management, and
investment of the fund shall be governed by Chapter
1, Title 49.
mi
49-9-203. Eligibility for membership in the
program.
All employers participating in any system administered by the board may cover their employees
under this chapter, except employees covered under
the Firefighters* Retirement Act. Nothing in this
chapter requires any political subdivision or educational institution to be covered by this chapter.
im
Part 3 . Contributions
49-9-301. Contributions to fund protrara - Adjustment
of retirement contribution rate.
49-9-302. Rates established on basis of agency experience
- Limitations • Annual report to governor and
Legislature.

49*9-301. Contributions to food program Adjustment of retirement contribution rate.
During each legislative session, the board shall
certify to the Legislature the percentage of employer
contributions required to fund the Public Employees* Disability Trust Fund. Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall adjust retirement
contribution rates to maimain adequate funding for
the disability trust fund.
i9r?
49-9-302. Rates established oa basis of agency
experience - Limitations • Annua! report to
governor and Legislature.
The board shall establish the contribution rate
based on the experience of the various public agencies and political subdivisions participating in the
program, which rate may not exceed l^o of salaries
and wages and shall report annually to the governor
and the Legislature the current contribution rates
assessed to the public agencies and political subdivisions.
19S7
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